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taken as a whole, constituted decedent's homestead, the Court properly
held that the statute governed the thirty-five acres owned solely by
the homesteader; and of course the other five acres, held as an estate
by the entirety, were unaffected by homestead law for descent purposes. The decision is significant in that it emphasizes the necessity
of fixing the extent of homestead realty by looking at the facts and
the treatment accorded the property by the family head, as distinct
from mere record title. The homestead realty is delineated first, and
only then are the rules of descent applied.
JuLIAN D. CLARSON

REAL PROPERTY: THE RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE
IN FLORIDA
National Turpentine & Pulpwood Corp. v. Mills,
57 So.2d 838 (Fla.1952)
In 1939 plaintiff's parents executed and delivered a deed to him
conveying a life estate and at his death "title to invest in his heirs
in fee simple, share and share alike."' The lower court construed the
deed to give plaintiff a fee simple absolute. On appeal, HELD, since'
the deed was executed prior to the enactment of the statute abolishing
the Rule in Shelley's Case, 2 the rule applied and plaintiff received
the land in fee simple absolute. Judgment affirmed.
Although the Rule in Shelley's Case was expressly abolished in
Florida by statute in 19453 and is inapplicable to conveyances executed
subsequent to that date, its possible operation still lurks in the background of every deed and will that became effective before that time.
The rule, although deriving its name from a case reported by
Lord Coke in 1579, 4 appeared even before that date in several English
ISimes states that if the remainder is "to the heirs share and share alike" the
Rule in Shelley's Case is generally applied, though words of that sort are interpreted
by some courts to mean persons of definite rather than indefinite succession. Such
a construction should render the rule inapplicable. See I SiMEs, THE LAW OF FUTURE
INTr.aEsrs §122 (1936); see also note 9 infra and text thereat.
2FLA. STAT. §689.17 (1951), originally enacted as Fla. Laws 1945,

c. 23126, §2.
3Ibid. The effective date of this statute was June 11, 1945.
4Wolfe v. Shelley, I Co. Rep. 93b, 76 Eng. Rep. 206 (K.B. 1579-1581).
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cases.5 As succinctly stated in Coke's report of Wolfe v. Sljelley:6
"... it is a rule in law, when the ancestor by any gift or conveyance takes an estate of freehold, and in the same gift or
conveyance an estate is limited either mediately or immediately
to his heirs in fee or in tail; that always in such cases, 'the
heirs' are words of limitation of the estate, and not words of
purchase."
At common law the rule was construed as being applicable only
in conveyances in which (1) the property was realty; 7 (2) the estates
purportedly conveyed to the grantor on the one hand and to his heirs
on the other were both legal or both equitable;8 and (3) the word
"heirs" was so used as to denote indefinite succession. 9 The more important early reasons for the rule were to prevent the feudal lord
from being defrauded of his fruits of seignorylo and to facilitate
alienation of land.11
A serious controversy concerning the Rule in Shelley's Case arose
in 1769 in the famous case of Perrin v. Blake, 2 in which Lord Mansfield unsuccessfully attempted to hold that it was a rule of construction
rather than a rule of law. The rule, though under tremendous attack
by this powerful jurist, ultimately emerged from the battle unscathed
and stronger than ever.
The original reasons for the rule no longer exist; and, aside from
the doctrine of stare decisis, 13 there seems little necessity for its application today. It is a technical rule of law that invariably acts to
5See 3 HomDswoRTu, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 107, 108 (1934).
sWolfe v. Shelley, supra note 4. In effect the rule gives to the first taker the
estate purportedly granted "to his heirs" by saying that "heirs" are words of
limitation, that is, the heirs will take by descent, which is controlled by the

ancestor.
7Tucker v. Adams, 14 Ga. 548 (1854); 1 SIMES, Tim LAw OF FurUPE INrmmrs
§220 (19386). But cf. Watts v. Clardy, 2 Fla. 869 (1848); see Bross v. Bross, 123 Fla.
758, 769, 167 So. 669, 673 (1936).
sElsasser v. Elsasser, 159 Fla. 696, 32 So.2d 579 (1947); 1 SIMEs, Tim LAw OF
FutruaR INTr.srs §125 (1936).
9DeVaughn v. Hutchinson, 165 U.S. 566 (1897); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hoppin,
214 Fed. 928 (7th Cir. 1914); 1 SiMSs, Tim LAW OF FuTum IN asrs §121 (1936).
'oSee Welch v. Gibson, 193 N.C. 684, 689, 138 S.M. 25, 27 (1927).
1ld.at 686, 138 S.E. at 26.
121 W. BI. 672, 96 Eng. Rep. 392 (K.B. 1769).
USee Day, Extent to Which the English Common Law and Statutes are in
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defeat the intention of the conveyancer.' 4 Particularly in testamentary
dispositions this intent should prevail,"5 unless some fundamental
common law real property rule is violated.16 But, being a rule of
property law on which many persons may have relied in acquiring
valuable property interests, it should not be abrograted by the courts.
Only by legislative fiat to operate perspectively can the rule be constitutionally abolished.
Even though the reasons for the rule no longer exist, the Florida
Court has consistently held it to be in force' 7 as part of the common
law of England adopted by this state,' 8 and yet until the instant case
has refused to apply it in any case involving realty in which it has
been invoked. Some of the Court's reasons for not applying the rule
were: its inapplicability to an executory devise;"9 ambiguous language; 20 its application would result in the creation of an estate in
fee tail which was prohibited by statute; 21 the words "child or children
of the body" are not equivalent to the words "heirs or heirs of the
body"; 22 the estates differed-one was equitable, the other legal.2 '
The Court indicated in an early case 24 that the rule would apply
to personalty, which it invariably did not at common law.2 This po26
sition found further support in the much later case of Bross v. Bross.
Moreover, there was an attempt in the Bross case, much as in Perrin
v. Blake,27 to repudiate the rule as a rule of law by a dictum to the
effect that the Rule in Shelley's Case was one of construction rather
Effect, 3 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 303, 314-315 (1950).
14See I SImES, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §117 (1936).
15 E.g., Bross v. Bross, 123 Fla. 758, 167 So. 669 (1936); Arnold v. Wells, 100 Fla.
1470, 1478, 131 So. 400, 404 (1930); Russ v. Russ, 9 Fla. 105 (1860).
16See Day, supra note 13.
'7Tankersley v. Davis, 128 Fla. 507, 175 So. 501 (1937); Omohundro v. Tallcy,
100 Fla. 1553, 131 So. 398 (1930); Arnold v. Wells, 100 Fla. 1470, 131 So. 400 (1930).
18F.A. STAT. §2.01 (1951).
'9Bross v. Bross, 123 Fla. 758, 167 So. 669 (1936); Russ v. Russ, 9 Fla. 105 (1860).
-0Omohundro v. Talley, 100 Fla. 1553, 131 So. 398 (1930).
2
'FLA. Coasp. GE.N. LAws §5481 (1927), now FLA. STAT. §689.14 (1951), Arnold
v. Wells, 100 Fla. 1470, 31 So. 400 (1930).
22Tankersley v. Davis, 128 Fla. 507, 175 So. 501 (1937).
23Elsasser v. Elsasser, 159 Fla. 696, 32 So.2d 579 (1947).
24
Watts v. Clardy, 2 Fla. 369 (1848) (devolution of slaves under South Carolina
law).
25SSee note 7 supra and text thereat.
2 123 Fla. 758, 769, 167 So. 669, 673 (1936).
2
rSee note 12 supra.
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than of property. 2 This dictum, contrary to the common law,2 9 was
unnecessary to the decision.
The Rule in Shelley's Case was correctly applied in the instant
case. The requirements at common law that the rule be applied only
to a conveyance of realty30 in which the estates were both equitable
or both legal 3 ' and in which "heirs" contemplated an indefinite
succession 32 were satisfied.
J. E. Hipp
MICHAEL S. WRIGHT, JR.

28123
-See
3oSee
31See
32
See

Fla. 758, 770, 167 So. 669, 674 (1936).
notes 12, 14 supra.
note 14 supra.
note 8 supra.
note 9 supra,
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